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A catalogue of vice: a sense of failure and incapacity to act among Roma Muslims in 
Macedonia  
 
Key words: failure, incapacity, weakness of the will, positive agency, Roma ethnicity, 
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A sense of failure: 
Zikir1 (Turkish, zikr; Arabic, dhikr) rituals at the “Gypsy”2 dervish lodge (tekke) - 
a distinctive Sufi practice of chanting the beautiful names of God3 - were scheduled on 
Sundays, a day-off according to the civil and Orthodox Christian calendar in Macedonia. 
In disregard of the locally voiced theological controversy that Tuesdays or Fridays (the 
most important day of the week in Islam) would have been more appropriate, the Rifai 
(Rifaiyya) order, also known as Howling Dervishes4, met on Sundays to accommodate 
those members who had full time jobs and were only available at weekends. Despite this 
measure, the turnout was unpredictable. Sometimes up to thirty dervishes participated. 
On other weekends, after several hours of lonely waiting, the two leaders of the order, 
                                                 
1 During my fieldwork in Macedonia (intermittent in 2006- 2007, one year in 2008-2009, and briefly in 2010), 
my Roma informants, long-settlers or new-comers from Kosova, spoke a colloquial Para-Romani admixture of 
local dialects and languages including a version of Romani, Macedonian, Turkish and Serbian. Codification of 
modern literary Macedonian has been gradually implemented in Macedonia since the creation of an independent 
republic in 1944 (Friedman 1998) but few Roma I worked with were proficient in all registers. Many of my 
informants rejected attempts by a local Romani NGO to teach them an emerging standardized Romani language 
because they saw this linguistic policy as patronizing and unfit for local conditions. Some watched Turkish 
television; most avidly consumed Serbian television. Ottoman and ModernTurkish and Turkish loanwords are 
an important component of Balkan languages, including Macedonian Romani dialects (Friedman 2003: 30-39). 
This multilingual situation has created a linguistic environment where people codeswitch between dialects and 
languages mid-sentence. For this article, I have transcribed words and expressions as they were articulated, 
perhaps tenuously and ungrammatically. I have borrowed the Latinization style of Macedonian from Keith 
Brown (2013) and rendered Arabic terms in Latin characters without accent marks.  
2 I use both appellations, Roma and “Gypsies”, purposefully to reflect local meanings. ‘Roma’ signals neutral, 
academic or politicized usage, well established in anthropology and among Roma elites. People’s commonplace 
self-description as a “Gypsy” highlights their own poignant articulation of marginalization in the Ottoman 
Empire and contemporary Macedonia. Although I do not endorse their perjorative language, it is important to 
retain the negative connotations of the term to comprehend my informants’ self-understanding as inept. 
3 A Rifai zikir ritual involves loud and repetitive chanting of a phrase “there is no god but God” (la ilaha illa 
allah), accompanied by forceful expulsion of air through one’s mouth - “howling”. 
4 Sufi orders have existed from the earliest days of Islamic history and spread worldwide. Sufi orders originated 
as hospices (Turkish, tekke; Arabic, ribat or zawiyya) where students, visitors and mendicant Sufis could pray, 
study and socialize (Ernst 2004:680).  In contrast to Christian monastic orders, dervish orders have a fluid 
hierarchical structure according to the degree of initiation and attainment of ethical and spiritual mastery (ibid.). 
In theory, a recruit into mystical Islam gradually progresses from a low rank of God’s lover (ashik) to a spiritual 
virtuoso (dervish; Arabic, darvish, translates as “poverty”) under the guidance of a shaykh (or sheikh, translated 
as “mastery”). An exemplary shaykh should possess spiritual qualifications, a great deal of theological and 
worldly knowledge and other merits. The leadership of a lodge is transmitted genealogically, but if a hereditary 
lineage is broken, a leader can be elected by the members of a lodge, which was the case with the father of the 
current “Gypsy” shaykh who took over the lodge after the departure of the last Turkish shaykh for Turkey in 
1950s.  
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the shaykh, Baba Mehmed, and his son and preacher (imam), Refik, would lock the gate 
of the lodge and trudge home, glum and irritated. Even when a ritual event had a high 
turnout, the rituals frequently disappointed as they did not generate the kind of ecstasy 
and enjoyment of activity (rahat) that dervishes hoped to experience. Sometimes a zikir 
ritual disintegrated because the dervishes could not synchronize their rocking and 
swaying movements and bitter arguments erupted about “why we are so inept” (zashto 
nas ne biva?) to bring off a spiritually charged performance. The shaykh grew angry 
when his dervishes chanted loudly, a practice permissible within the parameters of the 
Rifai, “Howling”, Sufi order. Baba Mehmed preferred a sober, quieter zikir5 to the 
“traditional”, spiritually intoxicated “racket”. “We do not have the ritual basics,” he 
complained.  
“Inept (nesposobni)”, said one of the dervishes after another ritual let-down. 
“One has to know his limits”, explained Refik. “We are not saints (evliyas; 
Arabic, awliya allah; translated as “allies of God”). We are Roma from Macedonia”. 
Among the ethnically Roma Sufis, members of the male-only Rifai dervish order 
I worked with in Macedonia, a sense of failure emerged at the nexus of people’s own 
racialized perception of innate ineptitude for religion and their philosophical take on the 
problem of actualizing desire for self-transformation in action. Sufis are conventionally 
seen as exceptional Muslims who aim for supererogatory, excessive forms of piety, aptly 
dubbed the “spiritual athleticism in Islam” (Hodgson 1977[1974]: 393). Yet, my 
informants were the first to claim that they had routinely missed their prayers, botched 
up their rituals, squabbled with each other, and gossiped maliciously about everyday 
affairs. They lamented that they had “no capacity” (nemame kapatsitet) for religious 
performance.  
The article illuminates this dynamic of self-derogation. My informants experienced and 
articulated failure as a deferral between desire and action and as an inability to will 
themselves to commit to ritual disciplines and thus transform into virtuous beings. Their 
predicament- failure to act on one’s desire for virtue - allows me to analytically problematize 
action-centered, or positive, ‘I-can-do-it’, agency that constitutes a default conjecture about 
what counts as agency in anthropology. Positive agency foregrounds achievement6, success 
(Ortner 2003: 188; Demerath 2009), self-authorship, instrumentality, efficacy and self-
                                                 
5 A silent zikir is associated with the Nakshibendi (Naqshbandiyya) order, popular in Turkey and elsewhere.  
6 Achievement defies a trivial or normative definition (Long and Moore 2013:3). Broadly, it entails an 
understanding of “standards of excellence” and self-elaboration  (ibid.:15; 11). 
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determination, all of which are naturalized by anthropologists as “obvious grounds of 
experience” (Keane 2003:242). Consequently, “positivity”, i.e., “enactment of collective 
representations, as belief in beliefs, as valuation of values, as obedience to rules, as exercise 
of grammars”, constitutes a default assumption that strikes failure or ineptitude out as an 
‘aberration’ (Fabian 1990: 768). 
For example, inaction (Halliburton 2011) or apathy (Greenberg 2010) can be approached 
as a type of deliberative resistance or an efficacious mode of the political, respectively. 
Greenberg’s fascinating study of young people’s withdrawal from the state politics in post-
Miloshevic’s Serbia proposes apathy as an agentive form. However, agency is never 
explicitly defined, while its disavowal is traced to inaction, nonparticipation and inability to 
exert an effect. Reverse the logical argument, and the unexamined assumption that agency 
entails action, participation and efficacy becomes apparent. My aim, however, is not to 
dismiss this deeply entrenched assumption as flawed especially because agency as action, 
including collective action, serves well in contexts such as alterglobalization movements 
(Maeckelbergh 2009). Instead, I would like to render the conceptual pre-eminence of positive 
agency visible. 
 A similar exaltation of positive agency exists in some ethnographic studies of Islam that 
foreground the processes of self-cultivation and describe how efforts to transform Muslims’ 
selves and their culture-historical conditions prove successful. Crudely summarizing Saba 
Mahmood’s sophisticated argument about mosque movements in Egypt (2005), Mahmood’s 
informants found it in themselves to commit to prayer and, what’s more, to cultivate desire to 
pray and hone various qualities essential for everyday ethical formation; those who waivered 
in their self-discipline were admonished by those who succeeded (Mahmood 2012:230). Yet, 
how people account for their perceived failure (rather than achievement) remains nebulous. 
Certainly, there is no dearth of critical voices of Mahmood’s analysis of pietistic agency as 
self-cultivation. For example, Laidlaw has queried Mahmood’s presumed distinction of 
pietistic agency from a reified ‘Western liberal’ modality of action (Laidlaw 2014:150-154). 
Another trenchant critique of pietistic agency appears in Amira Mittermaier’s work about 
Egyptian Sufis that demonstrates how self-cultivation as a matter of volitional ritual regimen 
to attain piety is undermined by other-than-human modes of agency experienced as being 
acted upon by divine or unpredictable forces (2012). Samuli Schielke has argued that the 
portrayal of Islam as “a perfectionist ethical project of self-discipline” (Schielke 2010:2) 
obscures the fact that most people are not particularly pious or willing to adhere to 
prescriptive principles of their religion and some Muslims are indifferent to their religion. A 
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similar contradiction between purist religious precepts, ideals of virtous life, and a felt sense 
of failure to live up to religious ethical imperatives is at the core of many reformist 
movements in Islam (Marsden 2005; Metcalf 1994). Aiming to add a theoretical dimension to 
this body of literature, I look at a surprising case of Roma Sufis in Macedonia who aspired to 
a reformed religious self yet felt to have failed to fulfil their ambitions. Of particular interest 
to me is people’s own understanding of failure as incapacity, or an intrinsic ineptitude of 
“Gypies” to initiate desired action and escape this racialized ontology. In order to explore the 
difficulties and inhibitions of virtuous self-fashioning7, I shift attention from self-cultivation 
to self-overcoming, in a sense of obstacles to action and attainment of a desired ethical 
transformation. 
Below, I will provide some general historical context to the imperative for a reform in 
the “Gypsy” lodge. Then, I will detail my informants’ ruminations on the nature of their 
failure to become virtous and observant Sufis. A few episodes of reflective self-evaluation 
that resulted in drafting a catalogue of vice reinforced the dervishes’ conviction that failure 
correlated with their innate incapacity to act, consistent with the self-racialized perception of 
the “Gypsy” self although explanation should be sought in broader historical conditions of 
marginality of “Gypsies” and the emergence of ethno-national categories of the self in the 
Ottoman Empire and contemporary Macedonia. In the conclusion, I revisit the theoretical 
premises of this paper. 
 
Self-racialization and historical subjectivities 
The Republic of Macedonia, or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, was a 
province of the multi-faith Ottoman Empire until the early 20th century. Even today, its 
population is a mixture of Christians and Muslims. Albanian Muslims8, belonging to different 
branches of Islam, constitute an important religious and ethnic minority group in the 
predominantly Christian Orthodox and South Slav-speaking Macedonia. Although 
Macedonia was not engulfed in violence between its ethnicized populations like Croatia, 
                                                 
7 Elisabeth Anscombe (2006 [1959]) argued that ethics cannot be understood as a legalistic obligation. Building 
on non-utilitarian writings of Aristotle, Anscombe and others have redefined ethics as pursuit of virtues (virtue 
ethics), an activity valuable for its own sake. Multifarious across time and space, “catalogues of virtues” 
(MacIntyre 1981:181) enumerate physical, intellectual and socio-political “qualities the possession and exercise 
of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which 
effectively prevents us from achieving any such good” (ibid.: 191). Having appropriated these philosophical 
debates for their own purposes, anthropologists have forged an ethnographic approach to pervasiveness of 
ethical considerations in everyday lives (Lambek 2010). Importantly, the Aristotelian intellectual tradition of 
virtue ethics influenced Islam and Sufism. 
8 Some Albanians are Catholics.  
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Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, mundane relations between Albanians and Macedonians are 
a brew of civility and distrust (Neofotistos 2012). Co-existence and friendships are 
accompanied by a great deal of negative stereotyping and cultural racism (Dimova 2010). 
Recent primordialist nation-building projects in Macedonia, such as the construction of 
statues and buildings with ancient Greek and Roman aesthetics (Vangeli 2011), have 
furthered ethno-religious polarization between Christian Macedonian and Muslim Albanian 
populations as the government’s architectural rewriting of the Ottoman and socialist 
cityscape of Skopje has purposefully or unwittingly put the city’s ethnically and religiously 
plural and syncretic past under erasure (c.f. Taneja 2013).  
Smaller ethno-religious populations, such as Turks and Muslim Roma, see themselves 
and are seen by others as insignificant. Nevetheless, “things Turkish”, such as the language 
and soap operas, are highly valued by many Muslims in Macedonia (Ellis 2013:151). Muslim 
Roma that I worked with - hereinafter referred to as ‘the dervishes’ - craved Turkish cultural 
and material products and saw Turkish theologians and religious leaders as experts in 
authoritative, “correct” Islam. At the same time, my informats bore a grudge against “the 
Turks” for stigmatization of “Gypsies9” as flawed Muslims. Their historical subjectivity was 
shaped by a perception of exclusion of “Gypsies” from the circuits of religious learning in 
Ottoman times. It was said that “Turks”, the custodians of “true” Islam, barred “Gypsies” 
from entering religious schools (medresa), hid books from them, threw them out of mosques 
and Sufi lodges, and denied them the burial ground in Muslim cemetries. Historical data 
largerly corroborates this view (Barany 2001; Marushiakova and Popov 2001).  
 But, what if “the Turks were right”, reasoned the dervishes, thinking about “the 
Turks” as an abstract category, static from the Ottoman days till contemporary Macedonia. 
“Gypsies”, they reiterated, “have a limited capacity for learning Islam”. Language of failure 
can be revealing of self-deprecation as worthless and abject beings on a different scale and 
plane: local and global, political and subjective (Peutz 2011:339). For instance, Peutz has 
encountered intimate articulations of abjection among the Bedouins in Yemen’s Soqotra 
                                                 
9  Roma ethnicity has been studied in anthropology, although much research has been channeled into clarifying 
‘Roma culture’ and, thus, essentializing Roma lives through reducing their experiences to the issue of ‘ethnic 
identity’ (Theodosiou 2007). This is one of the reasons why I do not frame this article as a contribution to Roma 
studies and do not review the relevant literature extensively (but see, Stewart 2013). Similarly, nationalism, 
ethnic co-existence and violence in the Balkans have been explored amptly. However, the conventional regional 
focus on nationalism poses a risk of isolating the Balkans in the “ethnonational ghetto” (Brown 2010:817, 819) 
that diminishes the theoretical relevance of the region to anthropology in general and obscures  the fact that 
many people are motivated by concerns other than ethnic identity politics. For example,  Arolda Elbasani and 
Olivier Roy (2015) have criticized the narrow focus on Islam as ethno-national identity in the Balkans and urged 
for a more nuanced understanding of Islam in the Balkans as an alternative space of political, religious and 
spiritual experiences.  
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Archipelago, which she struggled to sufficiently explain as mere rhetoric directed at her as a 
foreign researcher and potentially a benefactor. Instead, Peutz suggests that the Bedouin 
abjection is not a theatrical affectation; it is inhabited and deeply felt. Another example of 
self-derision comes from Joel Robbins’s study of Christianity among the Urapmin in Papua 
New Guinea that “dwells on sinfulness” (2006: xviii) and, just like Sufism, emphasises the 
need for self-perfection. The Urapmins constitute their sense of self through a Christian trope 
of moral fallenness (ibid.: xxiii) in its multiple manifestations: bad-tempered quarrels, 
inability to attract development, and perceived relapse into traditional forms of religiosity and 
so on. In parallel with my research, the Urampins did not cite outside forces, such as 
postcolonialism, as a sufficient justification of their moral failure; “to them, the decrepit state 
of their community life was the result of their inherent depravity as sinful creatures” (ibid.: 
xxiv). 
 
Reformist Islam  
Driven by the experiences of marginality, shaykh Mehmed Baba, the current leader of 
the “Gypsy” lodge, initiated a modernizing reform of his mystical order in the 1980s. The 
reform aimed at “rationalizing” the order and preening it of “superstitions”, such as 
divinatory practices, that the reformed dervishes interpreted as usurping Allah’s power to 
know the future. By way of background, the initial impetus to the reform can be grasped in 
relation to a complex entanglement of reformist Islam and socialism in the region. In the 
1980s, Baba Mehmed as a young Roma Muslim in socialist Yugoslavia was drawn to the 
ideological and vernacularized tenets of socialism, with its core values of rationality, 
progress, and self-perfectability. He has remained sympathetic with the key premises and 
policies of the Yugoslav socialism, such as modernization through industrial growth, 
education that rapidly increased the literacy rate in Macedonia, and a version of secularism 
that defined some religious practices as “backward”. 
However, tropes of modernization, rationalization and secularization, analogous to 
socialist discourses, characterize reformist Islam that has circulated in the Ottoman Empire, 
subsequently Turkey and the sovereign Balkan states, from the 19th century until today 
(Clayer 2008:128-155; Fortna 2002).  In the 19th century, many Ottoman Sufi orders 
underwent institutional modernization and reforms (Turkish, islah) that saw an incorporation 
of contemporary techniques of governmentality, such as bureaucratization, centralization and 
new meritocratic assessment of qualifications for a shaykh’s post (Silverstein 2009). More, 
many Ottoman and regional, Balkan, Sufi lodges jettisoned their unconventional, 
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“antinomian”, ritual practices (Watenpaugh 2005), such as drinking spit to transmit and 
receive a spiritual blessing (a common practice among the grandparents of my informants 
who expressed disgust at the thought), and alighned with more legalistic, scriptural versions 
of Sunni Islam promoted by Ottoman and Turkish religious institutions and officials, such as 
Turkish Consulates and Sunni hodjas (Tsibiridou 2015:180, 189).  
Because of the affinities between the discourses of socialism and reformed Islam and 
zealous transmission of Communist ideas into religious contexts (Elbasani and Roy 
2015:461), the battle over power and claims to authoritative knowledge between reformers 
and traditionalists that informed the political and religious life in the Ottoman provinces since 
the 19th century (Katsikas 2009) appears to have been won unders socialism by the reformist 
official organizations, who sought to assert control over religious affairs (Elbasani and Roy 
2015:461) and explicitly promoted ‘progressive’ values of rational education and 
modernization and, thus, inadvertently contributed to a kind of secularization of the state 
(ibid.:463). Thus, not only did the the socialist federal state pursue the policy of containment 
and co-optation of religious institutions in the second part of the 20th century (Ballinger and 
Ghodsee 2011), but the rhetoric and institutions of Yugoslav socialism seemed to have 
become a vehicle of reformist Islam, often represented by the official Islamic Communities in 
Yugoslavia, which saw many religious practices ‘atavistic’ even though, in contrast to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sufi orders were not banned in Yugoslav Kosovo and Macedonia 
(Henig 2014:100). At the same time, a modality of neoliberal agency, underpinned by the 
resonant notions of self-improvement and management of failure (Gershon 2011: 540-542), 
might be gaining currency in post-socialist Macedonia and shading into my informants’ 
religious project, boosting its appeal. 
As an instantiation of the above processes, Baba Mehmed’s reform at the “Gypsy” lodge 
induced a radical change. Previously, the members of the order had gathered for ecstatic 
rituals that involved body piercing with skewers. They sang, drank plum brandy, practised 
divination, witchcraft, jinn exorcism, and amulet making. Mehmed Baba, now in his late 50s, 
felt ashamed reminiscing about those practices. They seemed “un-Islamic” to him, something 
a “Gypsy” would do. Under his guidance, all ecstatic rituals were replaced with meticulous 
self-instruction in Islamic theology. However, the “rationalizing” reform in the Roma lodge 
drove many of its members away because it thinned out the intensity of worship. Those who 
stayed within the order did so for many reasons: pride and pleasure in learning the Quran, 
childhood friendships and family networks, and better marriage prospects within Roma 
circles. Those who abandoned the order either joined “traditionalist” Sufi congretations or 
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took the reform further and converted to stricter movements like Salafiyya and Wahhabiya 
that gained prominence in the post-socialist Macedonia.  
For the “traditionalists”, the reform engendered a sense of loss. The 
“traditionalist” Roma shaykhs continued to convene Sufi gatherings in ritual halls, 
known as semana, that usually consisted of a room inside or adjacent to a shaykh’s 
house, decorated with carpets and Islamic posters and prayer beads. It was said that the 
difference between a lodge, (tekke or tekija), and a semana, was that a “true” lodge ought 
to be built around a tomb (turbe) of outstanding Sufi ancestors while a ritual hall had a 
make-shift quality. In my informants’ eyes, semanas lacked spiritual energy and healing 
powers that tombs emit. More, during my research, semanas and their shaykhs were 
continuously denigrated by rumours of ritual and ethical failings among their members. 
Some shaykhs were famed for sexual misconduct; others were described by the dervishes 
as greedy, money-grabbing impostors. The title of a shaykh and a certificate (hilafet) 
could be bought inexpensively from other shaykhs, and many Roma possessed it despite 
their lack of spiritual, genealogical and scholarly credentials in the eyes of local people 
who proclaimed that Sufi Islam in Macedonia was inauthentic and corrupt.   
In sum, the reformist Islam and socialism, with their rhetoric of modernization 
and rationality, coalesced into a perspective among the reformist Rifai dervishes that 
their inherited religious practices were “backward”. Another Yugoslav legacy was 
literacy, a skill acquired by “Gypsies” in the socialist Yugoslavia. Literacy facilitated an 
engagement with religious texts that became rapidly available in Islamic book shops that 
mushroomed in the post-socialist Macedonia. After socialism, the religious marketplace 
opened up and, today, Islamic literature bookshops, satellite television, and the internet 
enable access to Islamic theology. The dervishes, who were all literate, read newly 
available Islamic literature avidly, but their encounter with textual Islam only deepened 
their sense of failure. For the dervishes, the increasing familiarity with the requirements 
of Islamic piety added a theological dimension to the sense of ethnic marginality and 
self-abjection. 
 
 Disciplinary meetings  
How did the dervishes interpret Sufi injunctions? The subtleties of Sufi theology 
are beyond the scope of this essay; I can only illuminate my informants’ tentative 
definition of Sufism, scrupulously compiled out of internet sources and printed out for 
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me by Refik. Their working definition said that Sufism (Tesavvuf; Arabic, Tasawwuf) 
constitutes  
“a spiritual journey (suluk). The aim is to become a mature human being (vozrasni 
chovek).  Tesavvuf teaches how to reach the level of insani kamil (translated as ‘perfect human’), 
a complete, without flaws, well-brought up and well-educated human being (potpoln, bez 
nedostatok, vospitan i obrazovan chovek). Crucially, Tesavvuf is a struggle against one’s lower 
self10 (nefs; Arabic, nafs) through the cultivation of self-control, sincerity, piety, steadfastness in 
worship (istraynost vo ibadet). A good dervish should be committed to “ritual practice” (praksa) 
and ethical self-work (samoureduvanye)”. 
This programmatic definition of Sufism is important because it determined the 
coordinates of virtue, posited interiority - the lower self - as the locus of self-discipline, 
and accepted ritual practice as “the unconditional ought” proposition (Beldo 2014), a 
performative necessity without which a sought-after self-transformation was unfeasible. 
In early Islam, ethics meant the practice of self-discipline but was later codified and 
systematized as abstract values which, nevertheless, have to be embodied and enacted as 
virtous dispositions (Moosa 2003:225). The bedrock of Sufism is control and struggle 
with vice (Sedgwick 2003:5). With this end in view, different Sufi techniques, such as 
solitary or communal zikir, are prescribed because Sufism goes beyond compliance with 
the commands of the divine law (sharia) by adding a possibility of ethical refinement 
through mystical insight (Heck 2006). Nevetheless, the propositional ‘ought to’ posits a 
problem of re-enactment in practice.  
Many failed rituals were followed by the moments of collective introspection that 
the dervishes called a “disciplinary meeting” (distiplinski sostanok). One night, Refik, 
chaired the meeting that gathered ten dervishes. The preacher wanted to draw a 
programme of action (plan-program) that everyone should adhere to. 
“Now, prayer…we have to pray regularly,” said Refik. “I didn’t come to pray in the 
morning. It is really hard. In the morning, I was impure, had intercourse with my wife, then in 
the afternoon I had a guest …We need to schedule our whole day around worship to see the 
results. We need to pray to keep djinn spirits away: mandatory prayers, plus additional ones 
(nafile), plus daily reading of the Quran to accumulate merit”. 
                                                 
10 The term nefs (or nafs) is not easy to pin down. It can be translated as sinful dispositions, passions, evil 
inclinations, or vice. Ewing, for example, translates nafs as a “bodily soul” (1990: 259) to avoid unwarranted 
reintroduction of the Cartesian dualism.  Sedgwick’s description of nafs as a lower self fits my informants’ 
understanding (2003:4). I gloss nefs as vice for stylistic reasons. 
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 Refik warned the dervishes of the dangers of lapsing into Evangelical Christianity, if 
they could not find it in themselves to change. “You need to decide what moves you …” 
“Money”, joked one of the dervishes and everybody laughted. 
“Not me”, said Refik 
“Nothing moves us (nishto nas ne biva)”, said another dervish.  
“I long to strengthen this congregation”, said Refik. “Transform you, remind you to 
come to the lodge, consolidate your faith. I told you (Refik pointed an accusing finger at one 
of the dervishes) to come to prayer yesterday, and you told me you had to finish something at 
work. We are slack practitioners of Islam. An electric bulb will not shine without energy.  I 
don’t want to mention their names but why are our closest friends not here today? We haven’t 
seen them for a month. Why can’t we follow Allah’s commandments even though we know 
them? You know religion, why don’t you live according to its principles? (Zashto ne zhivesh 
kako Allah, a znaesh din?). Where there is a will, there is a way (Samo volya da imame).” 
“Are we here to chat or shall we come up with a collective programme of action?” 
somebody protested.  
“Shall we draft the programme of action?” asked Refik.  
One dervish stood up: “We need to undersand that we live in sin at home. Pornography, 
sports channels, alcohol, city crowds… I wish I was scared of Allah. I came here of my own 
accord; you don’t have to tell me to come and then pipe on like this... Okay, let’s draft the 
programme...” 
“Pardon me but why are we here today? I’ve got work to do,” interrupted another dervish.  
Refik suggested: “I could create a file, like a police file on each one of you. To write 
everything down, to organize you, to note down who came, who was absent and why”. 
 “That’s too bureaucratic!” 
“Maybe something will touch your heart.” 
“Nothing will touch us. We are Sufis in the name alone”.  
“Is there a man who is not motivated by anything?” 
“We don’t even pray”. 
One dervish stormed out of the room: “I have had enough of this. We always talk about 
prayers. I am ashamed to speak of Islam”.  
Another dervish jibed: “I am burning with energy today, and this one (he nudged a dervish 
next to him) is showing me his new mobile phone…” 
“Let’s wrap it up”, suggested the dervish who wanted to go back to work. 
11 
 
Everybody nodded and started collecting their things. “If we are not going to pray, there is no 
point in meeting here, in the lodge”, concluded Refik.  
Next day, I bumped into Refik on the way to his house. He carried a shopping bag and 
fretted about the dispiriting meeting the night before. At home, we were joined by two 
dervishes who struck a conversation about how, in their view, moral turpitude (rasipanost) 
was a product of modernity as local people could not approximate old Sufis out of sheer 
laziness. The two men discussed how Osmanli Turks did not teach correct Islam to other 
nations (natsiya), which was why Roma were underdeveloped (zaostanati). Anyhow, even 
those among them who knew correct interpretations of the Quran did not practise them, they 
said. Would a good Muslim enter a mosque without ablutions? In Macedonia, I was told, 
Roma dervishes know Islamic history and theology but go to a mosque with a dirty bum; 
Roma, they said, are “black, bruised; they make a travesty of religion (tsirni, pomodreni, 
igrat maytab)”.  
 
The catalogue of vice 
The disciplinary meeting reiterated the parameters of failure: an intrinsic incapacity of 
Roma dervishes to commit to rituals and control one’s nefs to effect a transformation into 
virtuous beings. It had also broached the subject of the weakness of the will as a failure to 
overcome one’s reluctance to pray – the topic to which I will return shortly. Nevertheless, the 
disciplinary meeting had energized some members of the congregation and a few days later, 
two dervishes arrived at the preacher’s house. The brothers, Aslan and Kariman, sought the 
preacher’s advice on how to proceed practically on the path to true Sufism. Refik suggested 
that there were three methods: the method of good deeds, the method of love and the method 
of struggle against one’s lower self (nefs) – but he was not sure what the methods involved in 
practice. Aslan brought with him a little notebook in which he had recorded a few important 
quotations from the theological books he had been reading. Aslan was impressed and 
confused by the Sufi scholarship and asked the preacher to clarify the meaning of one quote: 
“Faith marks the difference between people”. 
Refik: “I don’t get it”. 
Aslan read another quote: “The path of a Sufi who practises jurisprudence (fikhr) is 
the most complete. If you discard fikhr, you become an apostate”. 
Refik shrugged his shoulders again: “I do not understand”. 
The men sat in silence for a few minutes. 
Kariman: “Yesterday I lay in bed and had a feeling that all was lost, all knowledge”.  
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Aslan peered into his notebook: “Here it says the five actions (dela) to achieve a 
higher level of spirituality are to value poverty over wealth, to refrain from eating…(He 
paused and glanced at the corpulent preacher). The first stage, a person (chovek) is 
conscious of his being (svesten na svoya sostoyba). Next, hearing and speech will be taken 
away; only the heart will speak. Then, comes either consciously or unconsciously (He 
stumbled and finished the sentence abruptly)… the secrets of the veil (gayb) are revealed”.   
Kariman: “Yesterday I was searching for meaning, thinking about everything I know 
and … I do not understand it, brother”. 
Refik interrupted him: “I am groping for words to explain. It is the same story with all 
Sufis. One speaks about special abilities but there is no consistency in what he says, 
everything is mixed up (nema nishta dosledno, meshano). Look at what one of them says. 
(Refik got up and read from his computer screen). “For a start, you are content to follow 
Allah’s guidelines. With hard labour, impossible without hard labour, follow faithfully the 
Prophet Muhammed, be obedient, recognize Allah’s oneness and do not attribute any evil to 
him.” And there is no method that teaches you how to strive for Allah. One must strive. It 
continues, “Temptation, here one can see the awareness inside the spiritual eye. A Sufi must 
remove the veil.”  Rifai say there is a veil between Allah and a human, throw it open with the 
correct zikir and the Quranic verse (ayet). How you confront temptation will be a proof of 
your spirituality. Sufis say “Weed the garden of perfection”. But, what should we do? [His 
voice raised in exasperation]. It is not clear to me. They say when all the hope dies, all 
material and bodily needs die; first dies all the hope in this world. Withdraw from people, 
purge your passions, lose you sexual desire (nagon), and accept the will of Allah. Overcome 
your desires…11” 
Kariman: “We wallow in sin”.  
Three days later, Refik, his wife and I were sitting at their coffee table strewn 
with chips, mayonaise stains and oily hamburger wraps. It was nearly midnight. I asked 
to explain the meaning of nefs.  
Refik drew two columns on a piece of paper. One was titled “What should be 
eliminated” (shto treba da se izgubi); another, “What should be controlled” (shto treba 
da se kontrolira). In the left column, Refik wrote down various nefs on the scale of 
gravity: 1. idolatry (shirk); 2. disbelief/ rejection of Allah (kufur); 3. nervousness 
(gadeb); 4. pride (kbr); 5. sexual desire (shehvet).  
                                                 
11 In this paragraph, the quote is deliberately arcane to demonstrate the dervishes’ perplexity at Sufi figures of 
speech.   
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He paused, thinking about other nefs and filled the columns, creating a catalogue 
of vice:  
To eliminate To control 
Pride and boasting (chalam)  
Backbiting (ozboruvanye)  
Jealosy (zavidlivost) 
Hypocrisy (dvolichnost) 
Narcissism (samobendisanost) 
Avarice (koristolyubiye) 
Cynicism (tsinichnost) 
Hatred (omraza) 
 
 
Jealousy ( lyubomora)  
Nervousness (nervoza) 
Lying (laga) 
Lust (nagon) 
Stubbornness (inaet) 
Ambitiousness (ambitsioznost) 
Indifference (ramnodushnost)  
Chattiness (zborlest)  
The real challenge, Refik explained, was to come up with practical exercises to 
control one’s nefs. Withdrawal into solitary prayer (halvet; Arabic khalwa) required a 
separate room, which was impossible to procure in overcrowded conditions of Roma 
households. A halvet room in the lodge burnt in the 1990s and was not restored. Refik 
suggested that pride can be controlled by conventional Sufi methods that cultivate 
humility: begging in the streets. Refik recommended self-monitoring of one’s 
transgressions by keeping a diary. He argued that every dervish could carry a small 
notebook with him to record how many times per day he ogled at women, thought about 
money, or got angry.  
The above episodes might constitute a tacit mode of self-knowledge and ethical 
self-work (Keane 2010: 75-76). However, undetected transformation had little value for 
the dervishes in the absence of an ostensible ritual action, such as prayer, because they 
formulated their reform as a self-conscious activity, a programme of action, with a 
specific goal in mind: overcoming of the lower self. The already-mentioned definition of 
Sufism (Tesavvuf) alludes to a process of self-tranformation into a perfect human that 
involves a gradual decentering of the self and a reorientation from one’s own desires and 
needs to an ethically good life in the presence of others and God. The decentering 
involves a rejection of the lower self (nefs) that results in self-annihilation (fena; Arabic, 
fana) (Heck 2006). Self-annihilation progresses from reflective concern with the self in 
order to initially inculcate Sufi ethical dispositions to the eventual habituation of Sufi 
ethics when one forsakes one’s self in God. In this manner, the Sufi journey is both 
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internal self-transformation by means of ethico-ritual discipline and self-transcendence. 
The Sufi imperative was consistently formulated by the dervishes as a reflectively and 
actively sought rejection of one’s habitual actions and vice. Virtue was seen both as a 
telos that could be strived for in ritual and as an on-going process, in which case 
perfection is unattainable and failure is inevitable like the total detachment of a Jain 
(Laidlaw 1995). 
That winter the snow fell early and lasted for four months. The roads were 
slippery and the winds pierced to the bone. Few dervishes ventured out to visit the 
preacher for advice or theological conversation (sohbet) and the doors of the lodge often 
remained bolted. Refik felt defeated by the lack on enthusiasm for worship and futile 
search for employment and stayed at home watching television.  
 
 Incapacity and the weakness of the will 
My argument is twofold. First, I suggest that a sense of failure sprang from the tension 
between the ethno-nationalist and racialized definition of the ‘Gypsy’ personhood as 
predetermined by one’s perceived ‘culture’ and ethnicity, and the reformist striving to 
overcome this fixity and think about the self differently, as somebody capable and open to 
experiment and transformation. Through simultaneous acknowledgment and occlusion of the 
historical circumstances of their marginality, the dervishes explicitly articulated their failure 
as an inability to overcome one’s intrinsically inept “Gypsy” nature and commit to the 
desired course of action. Education, specifically self-instruction in Islamic theology, failed to 
engender the change because the dervishes’ self-understanding resonated strongly with ethno-
nationalist conceptions of personhood (c.f. Ciotti 2006) that makes a deterministic and 
essentializing claim about the relationship between ethnicity, culture, nation and the self. 
According to this ahistorical but ubiquitous logic, one’s ethnicity, culture and personhood are 
fixed, inherited and innate12. Such ethno-national personhood might contradict a religiously-
inspired project of self-fashioning that requires a degree of discontinuity with a former self 
(c.f. Lambek 2013).  
Self-racializing and cultural essentialism constitute a temporal perspective that impinges 
on one’s future-oriented imagination that sees future as “a space of possibilities and a project 
of action” (Vigh 2006:483). Refomist aspirations are an element of future orientation but, in 
their prospective form, they are “always a deferred project” (Weiss 2009:37). Failure occurs 
                                                 
12 The critical essays by Stolcke (1995), Candeia (2010) and Cowen (2008) are of great interest.  
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because one aspires to and anticipates a desirable future as a completed action that will have 
been executed (Throop 2013:35-39). In this framework, the recurrent trope of “Gypsy 
incapacity” among the dervishes was not only an understanding of history but an anticipation 
of failure. A Sufi lodge can be understood as an “inaugural scene” (Mattingly 2012), a kind 
of “moral laboratory” (ibid.) where a future virtous self could be cultivated. However, in this 
ethnography, the ontological potentialities of an unstable mystical self were inhibited by 
essentialism of deeply held racialized identification as “Gypsies”, a conservative definition of 
the self that the dervishes found impossible to escape (contrast, Campbell 2015).  
Yet, as mentioned, ethnic marginality as an explanation of the perceived failure to 
become virtous Sufis does not exhaust the interpretive possibilities of this material. I also 
want to understand failure as a hiatus between a formulated desire (desire to pray) and 
absence of anticipated action (prayer). Failure has been discussed in anthropology primarily 
in the context of an isolated faltered performance rather than a series of events - a project - 
unfolding over a period of time. A number of ethnographies of ritual or performative failure 
have implicitly problematized failure because ritual is intrinsically risky (Howe 2000). 
Stanley Tambiah suggests that, in contrast to practice, which refers to invariant and formal 
elements of rituals, an instantiation of practice, i.e. the actual performance13 of a ritual, is 
open to uncertainties, variations, and mistakes of enactment (1979:115, 136). There are 
descriptions of faltered ritual routines (Husken ed. 2007), inefficient magical acts (Luhrmann 
1989: 129-153), failed prophecies (Festinger et.al., 1956; Kravel-Tovi 2009: 254), 
inconclusive healing séances (Lewis 2000), reluctance to publicly authenticate rituals 
(McIntosh 2004; Wolf 1990; Chao 1999) and failure of images to index the invisible reality 
(Suhr 2015). Semantic failure to generate meaning has been explored in ethnographies of 
Christianity (Engelke and Tomlinson 2006). Bembi Schieffelin (1996) has investigated why 
some rituals produce qualitatively different social and spiritual reality, or “presence”, and 
why others result in performative failure. A performative failure can be triggered by a lack of 
expressive competence of ritual performers, a lack of interactional credibility between ritual 
performers and their sceptical audience, or sheer contingency of a concrete performance 
(ibid.: 59-90).  
                                                 
13 Anthropologists draw the line between performance as a theatrical metaphor that connotes illusion and per-
form-ance as something that substantiates, materializes and gives form to practice (Meyer 2009:7). Performance 
is different from performativity (Kulick 2003). Performance is something concrete that you do. Performativity is 
a process that creates subject positions. Many anthropologists use performance in the Kulick’s sense of 
performativity as an event that generates presence and reforges one’s ethical self (Schieffelin 1996:59).  
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In addition to performative failure, failure in anthropological scholarhip can refer to 
ethical contradictions and disjuncture between ideals of religious purity and realities of 
quotidian existence (Laidlaw 1995; Mayblin 2010), which has also informed some of the 
literature on Islam (Marsden 2005; Schielke 2009). Today’s anthropological discussions of 
virtue ethics are heavily influenced by a neo-Aristotelian idea that “cultivating virtue is part 
of that becoming and action (with all its frailty) is at the centre of things” (Mattingly 
2012:307). So, frailty is at the heart of my ethnography but, in this case, there is no clash 
between alternative ethical codes; instead, there is a more basic disruption of an agentive 
causality: desire into action. The dervishes did not always share with me the language of 
philosophy of action and virtue ethics, but in the course of their deliberations about failure, 
the dervishes introduced an analytical distinction between desire and action (e.g. prayer) that 
strongly resonates with the Aristotelian notion of the weakness of the will (akrasia). In a 
sense, this is the most straightforward way of failing: not being able to cause something to 
happen yet trying to act which involves reflexivity about a possibility of failure, and/or an 
actual failure (Hornsby 2010:19; Bach 2010:51).  
Human beings have a capacity to will to do or not to do something, for example, to be 
different (Frankfurt 1971:7), to experiment with one’s self (Matza and O’Neill 2014) or to be 
virtuous. This is particularly relevant for our understanding of virtue not as a given ability, 
but something that engages the will (Foot 2002). Jason Throop has coined the term “effortful-
ness” to describe, in Ricoeur’s terms, an inner push that “pro-jects the project” (2013:35), 
but, the will, can do just as well to capture the same principle of actualizing desire in action. 
Harry Frankfurt succinctly defines the will as a “second-order desire” (1971:6), which is not 
the same as prior psychological causes that are commonly called ‘intentions’ of an agent 
(Bowden 2014). Frankfurt argues that the will is “an effective desire – one that moves (or 
will or would move) a person all the way to action” (Frankfurt 1971:8). 
 However, what happens when one is not moved to action, as the dervishes debated 
during their disciplinary meeting? In practical philosophy, the Aristotelian notion of akrasia, 
or weakness of the will, problematizes the automatism of the motivational link between a 
formulated desire and action. Aristotle writes of different forms of desire: appetite, spirited 
emotion and “rational” desire (boulesis) (Dahl 2009:498), rational in the sense of mindful or 
formulated ethical thought (ibid.: 503). For Aristotle, a reflectively formulated desire for 
what seems the good originates in the mind but the mind is also subject to analytical 
differention into theoretical and practical intellect or reason. It is the practical rather than 
abstract theoretical reason and a reflectively formulated desire that compels a person to act 
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(ibid.: 508). Here, Aristotle disagrees with Plato who saw the weakness of the will as a 
pedagogical problem of knowing (Rorty 1970), a question that puzzled the dervishes as well. 
According to Plato, if a person is educated in the principles of virtuous behaviour, she will act 
upon her knowledge. Vice, for Plato, is an intellectual failure of not knowing what is morally 
best. In his distinction between theoretical and practical reason, Aristotle rejected Plato’s 
mentalist model that the knowledge of the good constitutes a sufficient motivational force, 
which was precisely the dervishes’ conundrum: incapacity to act in spite of knowing the 
good. For Aristotle, a qualitatively different combination of desire and thought (i.e. practical 
reason) moves a person into action (Rorty 1970:56). A virtous person possesses a habit of 
acting. In contrast, an akrates, who suffers from the weakness of the will, finds it difficult to 
develop a habit of acting according to his or her formulated desires.  In this reading of 
Aristotle, the weakness of the will implies an inability to pursue a course of action that we 
intensely desire (Dahl 2009).  
Jon Bialecki narrates how the pastors of the Vineyard, an American Neocharismatic 
church, have a tripartite conception of the will (2014). There is an active will of a person. 
There is God’s will. Crucially, there is the “recalcitrant will, the unwilling aspect that has to 
be overcome, the stubborn attachments that prevent a person from simply choosing what she 
wills, and not having to attempt to change their direction by threading their will through God” 
(ibid.:2). The ideas of the weak or recalcitrant will points out to a fundamental philosophical 
problem that self-cultivation is premised on the simultaneous process of self-overcoming, i.e. 
becoming what one is not or becoming a non-self (Mulhall 2013:ix), moving away from 
one’s prior self. Far from being exclusive to philosophy, the ideas of non-self, self-
overcoming, self-transcendence, renunciation, negation of one’s subject-position are at the 
heart of many mystical systems (Faubion 2013) including Theravada Buddhism (Leve 2011) 
and in a version of Sufi Islam I have described above. Ultimately, self-overcoming suggests a 
degree of difficulty since, for Aristotle, virtue is about what is hard (Foot 2003:1-19). In this 
formulation, failure is related to incapacity to will one’s self into action where the self in its 
plurality is as an obstacle to be overcome, and this is precisely how failure was understood by 
the dervishes. 
 
Coda: failure and positive agency 
Conceptually, the dervishes’ trouble with overcoming their static ethno-national 
personhood and reforming their “lower self” (nefs) permits me to refine the extant 
overstretched notion of agency that overrides failure and incapacity in favour of action and 
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self-cultivation. In this paper, I have reversed the order of agency and concentrated not on 
efficacy as an outcome of taken-for-granted action but on the motivational force (the will) 
that moves into action. I did so because to highlight ritual efficacy as an aftermath of a 
completed action implies the “near-inevitability” of processes themselves (Kendall 1996:19). 
The reversal seems significant to me because, inspired by Laidlaw, I would like to 
problematize a popular understanding of agency as “a matter of the effectiveness of action” 
(2002:315). As mentioned, agency is usually presumed to be within a shared context of 
understanding that requires no definition among anthropologists. However, explicit 
definitions of agency, such as “an ability to initiate events and begin something” (Gell 
1998:16) make apparent an unspoken assumption that agency is coterminous with action. 
This definition conflates volition with an intuitive category of causality and runs the risk of 
circularity as agency, events and actions can subsume each other (Lowe 2010:3). Finally, it 
makes a conjecture about human ontology. In this idealistic framework, an agent consciously 
or unwittingly engages in self-realization through action (Norman 1998:109-127). This 
philosophical vocabulary of self-fulfillment in action and becoming – derived from the 
discourses of Enlightenment and German Romanticism and differently present in Kant, 
Herder, Hegel, Sartre, Deleuze, Foucault and many others - has profoundly influenced 
anthropological theories of agency, subjectivity, and ethics (ibid.).  
I suggest that Gell’s definition of ageny refers to a specific modality of agency that 
entails “the act of doing x” (Austin 1955:105). However, this action-oriented agency, or 
positive agency, is frequently mistaken for generic and decontextualized as universal, 
which explains why failure is often overlooked. Positive agency is inadvertently 
privileged in many anthropological studies that tend to recast people’s misery and 
desperation into productive acts of, for example, ritual efficacy and potent technologies 
of the self. For example, the life of Mapuche clowns in Chile, whose adoption of 
stereotypically ‘white’ practices with their drunkenness and urban poverty, tends to be 
framed as a “positive mimetic cooptation of the potency of white Others” rather than a 
case of colonial tragedies, reattributes “agency where there is none” and denies 
“indigenous peoples the very possibility of defeat and failure that makes them human” 
(Course 2013:773, 790). Similarly, to brush aside the dervishes’ experience of abjection 
and their perceived incapacity to will themselves into ritual action would be to threaten 
the complexity of their being.  
The implication is that positive agency postulates human lives in linear terms of 
cause and effect, impact and outcome. My ambition has been to disaggregate and 
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circumscribe this notion of action-oriented agency because it obscures that self-
tranformation or anticipated action might be untenable. The motion is to treat action and 
efficacy-oriented positive agency as a narrow instantiation, a subset of agency that begs a 
re-definition of agency from action to potentiality whose nature is not the ability to do 
something but “the relation to one’s own incapacity” (Agamben 1999:182).  
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